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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 14179 
GOLDEN W. ROBBINS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal by Mr. Golden W. Robbins seeking to reverse a District Court 
decision granting a Summary Judgment in favor of the City in the sum of $252.00 for 
delinquent business revenue license fees. The said defendant-appellant seeks to have City 
Revenue Licensing Ordinances declared unconstitutional. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court, by and through Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., granted the 
plaintiff-respondent's motion for a Summary Judgment and granted judgment against the 
defendant-appellant, Golden W. Robbins, in the sum of $252.00, together with prejudgment 
interest in the sum of $45.36 for a total judgment in the sum of $297.36. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent seeks this court to uphold the decision of the Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson, Jr., Judge. 
FACTS 
The undisputed facts of the within action are as follows: 
1. The defendant-appellant, Golden W. Robbins, is duly authorized to and is practicing 
law within the State of Utah at 705 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, which office is 
within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City, Utah, a Utah municipal corporation. His annual 
income exceeds $10,000.00 per annum and he has, during the years in question, employed at 
least four employees. (R-182, 177) 
2. The defendant-appellant has paid to Salt Lake City Corporation no license fee or tax 
at any time relevant to the within action. At date of the hearing before the Third District 
Court, Mr. Robbins owed the sum of $252.00 for the years subject to the suit. (R-177) 
3. Salt Lake City ordinances impose a modest Business Revenue License fee calculated 
for those businesses with annual gross income exceeding $10,000.00 at an annual rate of 
$30.00, plus an additional fee of $3.00 for each and every employee exceeding one, engaged in 
the operation of the said income-producing activity. Those operations which have income of 
less than $10,000.00, only pay $7.50, plus $3.00 for each employee over one. There is imposed 
a maximum charge of $780.00. (R-59, 150; Appendix A) 
4. "Business" as used within the City Business Revenue License Ordinances is defined to 
include any person engaged in any profession, trade or occupation for economic gain, 
excluding only an employee rendering services to an employer under a contract for personal 
employment. (R-150, 151, 152; Appendix A) 
5. The City License Assessor has applied said Business Revenue License Tax Ordinance 
uniformly. Said Assessor has uniformly assessed every business, including individuals or 
organizations providing professional services, within his knowledge, which has a place of 
business within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City. (See Affidavit of Mr. Thad Emery; 
R-154) 
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6. The City has never attempted to regulate, control, supervise or in any way whatsoever 
assert jurisdiction over the practice of law. The taxing ordinance in question is solely a 
revenue-producing measure, whereunder funds are obtained to finance City services. (R-154, 
59; Appendix A) 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
SALT LAKE CITY HAS THE ENABLING POWER TO IMPOSE A BUSINESS 
REVENUE TAX AND INCLUDE WITHIN ITS SCOPE THOSE RENDERING 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INCLUDING ATTORNEYS AT LAW. 
In 1950, the Utah Supreme Court specifically upheld the power of Utah municipal 
corporations to impose a business revenue tax on lawyers, whose place of business is located 
within the corporate city limits. They affirmed this right against the challenges that: (1) the 
proposed tax exceeded the City's enabling power, and (2) that the practice of law was not a 
business which could be regulated and, hence, not one that could be taxed. This decision held 
that Ogden City had the power to impose a business revenue tax on attorneys under the 
provisions of what is now entitled 10-8-80, Utah Code Ann. 1953, and that it could impose a 
revenue tax without any regulation on the business taxed. This Court specifically stated: 
"A license to practice law issued by the State does not grant immunity from 
taxation." Davis v. Ogden City, 117 Ut. 315, 215 P. 2d 616, 623 (1950), 
reaffirmed in The State of Utah v. Taylor, —Ut.—, —P. 2d—, Supreme Court 
No. 13949(1975). 
This Court further observed: 
"As members of the bar, their admission to practice and their professional 
conduct after admission are essentially matters to be regulated by the judicial 
department of the state. As members and citizens of the state, county, and city, 
their rights, privileges and immunities, as well as their duty to pay a fair share of 
the expenses of government, like those of any other citizen, are controlled by the 
laws, ordinances and regulations of the political body of which they are a part and 
from which they receive protection." Davis v. Ogden City, id. at page 622. 
The Court cited with approval decisiofts and many other jurisdictions holding, in effect, 
that revenue taxes, as the one before the Bar, did not attempt to interfere with State 
regulations concerning the practice of law; rather, it was merely an attempt to increase 
revenue to pay for the services provided by the City. The Court observed: 
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'The municipality, in imposing an occupation tax upon attorneys, is not 
interfering with state regulations, for it is not attempting to prescribe 
qualifications for attorneys different from or additional to those prescribed by 
the state. It is merely providing for an increase in its revenue by imposing a tax 
upon those who, by pursuing their profession within its limits, are deriving 
benefits from the advantages especially afforded by the city. The tax levied upon 
the business of practicing law, rather than upon a person because he is an 
attorney at law . . . " Davis v. Ogden City, id at p. 623, citing Ex parte 
Galusha, 184 Cal. 697, 195 P. 406, 407. 
The decisions from our other jurisdictions are virtually uniform in upholding the type of 
license presently before the Bar. A case illustrative of many other jurisdictions and virtually 
identical to the facts before the Bar is Franklin v. Peterson, 197 P. 2d 788 (Cal. App. 1948). In 
this case, the City of Los Angeles imposed a fixed $12.00 license tax on a class, including 
attorneys for the first $12,000.00 in gross receipts and an additional $1.00 per year for each 
$1,000.00 of gross receipts or fraction thereof. The California court observed: 
'There is nothing new or novel about the imposition of revenue taxes upon the 
business of practicing law. As far back as 1886, in Royall v. Virginia, 116 U.S. 
572, 6 S.Ct. 510, 29 L.ed. 735, a revenue tax on attorneys was sustained. 
" . . . a license to practice law does not carry with it exemption from taxation. 
Attorneys are not public officers, but are engaged in a private profession pursued 
primarily for pecuniary profit. It must therefore be held that the weight of 
authority in this country is to the effect that there is nothing which particularly 
exempts the attorney from bearing a just share of necessary public burdens, and 
that consequently he can claim no specific exemption from an occupation tax 
imposed for revenue purposes, (citations omitted) 
"A lawyer's office makes certain demands upon the various fire, police, street 
and other functions of a city, which differ from above classes only in quantity, 
and not in quality. If the one should be required to assist in keeping up the 
revenue of a city, no reason is apparent why the other should not." Franklin v. 
Peterson, id. at page 790. (emphasis added) 
Another well-reasoned case is Sterling v. City of Philadelphia, 106 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1954). 
In that case an attorney sought to enjoin the City of Philadelphia from enforcing tax 
provisions of an ordinance against attorneys under an ordinance virtually identical to 20-3-2, 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1965. The Pennsylvania court cited with approval 
Davis v. City of Ogden, upholding the tax against attorneys. It said: 
"It would be a work in supererogation to cite the numerous cases in other 
jurisdictions which, with little if any break in their unanimity, hold that while, 
as members of the bar, their admission to practice and their professional conduct 
after admission are essentially matters to be regulated by the judiciarv department 
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of government, as members and citizens, on the other hand, of nation, state and 
city, their rights, privileges and immunities, as well as their duty to pay their 
share of expenses of government like those of any other citizen, are controlled 
by the laws and ordinances of the political body of which they are a part and 
from which they received their protection." Sterling v. City of Philadelphia, 106 
A.2d 796, 797 (Pa. 1954), citing as authority Davis v. Ogden City, supra. 
For other cases upholding this taxing authority see: 16 A.L.R.2d 1228 et. seq.; 
5 Am. Jur. 268, 269, §12; 9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, (3rd Ed.) p. 293, 
§26.130, Newlin v. Stewart, 111 SE.2d 608 (Ky. 1938); Baker v. Lexington, 53 
SW 16 (Ky. 1899); McCarthy v. Tucson, 255 P.329 (Ariz. 1924); Abraham v. 
City ofRoseburg, 105 P. 401 (Or. 1909); City of San Mateo v. Mullin, 139 P.2d 
351 (Cal. 1943); State v. Keller, 191 So. 524 (Fla. 1939); Sandstrom v. Ft. 
Lauderdale, 133 So.2d 755 (Fla. 1961); Lister v. Ft. Smith, 134 SW.2d 535 (Ark. 
1840); Post v. Grand Junction, 195 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1948) dictum; Jackson v. 
City ofGlenwood Springs, 221 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1950) dictum. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that Salt Lake City clearly has the enabling power 
and a mandate for its ordinance levying a revenue tax against attorneys whose place of 
business is within the corporate limits of the City. There has been no attempt to regulate the 
practice of law; the only City purpose has been to derive funds to help offset the cost of 
providing services to the members of the community within Salt Lake City. It is respectfully 
submitted that this Court should affirm the City's power to tax this defendant as provided by 
law. 
POINT II 
THE ORDINANCES SUBJECT OF THE WITHIN ACTION ARE NOT ARBITRARY 
OR DISCRIMINATORY. IT IS NOT UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION TO TAX A 
BUSINESS ENTITY AS A UNIT ON A BASE FEE, PLUS AN ADDITIONAL 
CHARGE FOR EVERY MEMBER THEREOF OVER ONE. 
This Court has laid down clear rules with regard to discrimination. The Court upheld an 
ordinance similar to the one before this Court against a challenge that it was discriminatory 
and arbitrary because it exempted attorneys who were employed by other persons, firms, or 
corporations; the Court observed: 
" i 
'Discrimination is the essence of classification and does violence to the 
Constitution only when the basis upon which it is founded is unreasonable. In 
fixing the limits of the class, the legislative body has a wide discretion and this 
court may not concern itself within the wisdom or the policy of the law. Our 
function is to determine whether an enactment operates equally upon all persons 
similarly situated. If it does, then the discrimination is within permissible 
legislative limits. If it does not, then the differentiation would be without 
reasonable basis and the act does not meet the test of constitutionality. " Davis v. 
Ogden City, id. at page 623. 
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As in the case before the Bar, the Ogden case involved an ordinance to raise revenue; 
further, it differentiated in the amount assessed for attorney-employees of firms practicing 
law. The only difference between Salt Lake City and the Ogden case is that Salt Lake City 
imposes a fixed $3.00 fee for each person over one in the firm. 
A license ordinance virtually identical to Salt Lake City's was also upheld in the case of 
City of San Mateo v. Mullin, 139 P.2d 351 (Cal. App. 1943). Here, in a case closely parallel to 
the one before the Bar, the City of San Mateo passed a revenue license tax on professions, 
including attorneys. The ordinance provided, as in Salt Lake City's ordinance, that where two 
or more persons in the profession were associated, then an additional license tax in a less 
amount shall be paid for each additional person after the first. An attorney challenged the tax 
as being discriminatory against sole practitioners; however, the tax was upheld. The 
California court correctly observed: 
"Within the rule of the authorities, as the classification may be accomplished in 
a variety of ways, any gradation will be sustained which is reasonable and fair and 
equally affects all within the class to which it is applied. And among the varying 
standards which may be adopted, certainly it cannot be objected to as unfair or 
unreasonable that as to a business class a reasonable distinction between members 
of the class cannot be based upon the number of vehicles and animals which are 
used in the prosecution of the business." City of San Mateo v. Mullin, id. at page 
354. (Emphasis added) 
The Court further observed: 
"If it is fair and reasonable to fix the license fee in accordance with the number 
of persons employed, it may with equal force and effect be said that the number 
used or engaged in the conduct of the business gives a sounder basis for 
determining the fair amount of the license fee. The number of employees may 
vary to a greater extent than the number of employers. If the number of 
employees are used or engaged in the producing or contributing to the output or 
the results of the business, it does not appear that it is unfair or unreasonable to 
group employer workers and listed employees. They all tend to increase the size of 
the business and the financial returns." City of San Mateo v. Mullin, id. at page 
354. (Emphasis added) 
After making these general observations, the San Mateo Court directly responded to the 
contention that the base tax of $15.00 discriminated against a sole practitioner because 
attorneys of larger law firms would only pay $5.00 under the firm's license. Of this contention 
the court stated: 
"There may be some confusion in differentiating between the right to practice 
law, evidenced by a certificate issued by the state, and the privilege of conducting 
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a legal business in a municipality. While the state certificate is a prerequisite to 
practice, the actual practice is a business. In re Galusha, supra. The tax is levied 
upon the business and not upon the person. Whether that business is conducted by 
one, or more than one, associated as partners or as employer and employee, it is 
still in the class of business as that word is used in the ordinance. If a firm of legal 
associates paid less than respondent as an individual, he might be aggrieved, but 
when each 'business' individually or as a firm pays the minimum tax of $15, 
respondent cannot justly claim discrimination. There may seem to be a 
discrimination between an individual and an individual plus an employee, or firm 
of associated or employee attorneys, but such a discrimination, if it existed, would 
not be a matter in which the individual respondent would be aggrieved, and, as we 
have herein held, such method of fixing license taxes has been approved. An 
employer and an employee may be taxed and the employer actually pay or be held 
responsible for the tax, and the designation of the tax, whether imposed upon 
property or upon 'the exercise of personal rights and privileges' is not controlling 
in determining its constitutionality." Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 
495, 508; 67 S.Ct. 868; 81 L.Ed. 1245; 109 A.L.R. 1327. 
'The exemption of some employers or employees 'is peculiarly a question for 
legislative decision.' Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., supra, 301 U.S. at page 
511, 57 S.Ct. at page 873, 81 L.ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327." City of San Mateo v. 
Mullin, id. at page 354, 355. 
Thus, the California court held: 
"The amount of the tax is not in the restraint of trade and not against public 
policy. In reaching the conclusion that the license tax herein is not 
unconstitutional, we have been guided by the rules set forth by the Supreme Court 
of this state and by the Supreme Court of the United States. In Ex parte Haskell, 
supra, 112 Cal. at page 417, 44 P. at page 725, 32 L.R.A. 527, the court said: 
'The very power to license for purposes of regulation and revenue involves the 
right to make distinctions between different trades and between essentially 
different methods of conducting the same general character of business or trade.' 
' . . . legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification.' " (Omitting 
citations) (Emphasis added) 
Further, the San Mateo court cited in Gillum v. Johnson, 62 P.2d 1037, 1044 as follows: 
"It is well established that the matter of classification is primarily one for 
legislative determination, and no argument has been advanced which would 
compel the conclusion that in its taxing features the classifications laid down are 
so arbitrary or unreasonable as to require judicial condemnation." City of San 
Mateo v. Mullin, id. at page 355, 356. 
These observations are well established law. See authorities cited in San Mateo v. Mullin, 
supra, 53 C.J.S., Licenses §22(a) and (b); McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,§26.60; Salt 
Lake City v. Christensen Co., 34 Ut. 38, 95 P. 523; 17 A.L.R. (NS) 898; Clark v. Titusville, 
184 U.S. 329, 46 L.Ed. 569 (1902); Howe v. State Tax Commission, 10 Ut.2d 362, 353 P.2d 
468 (1960); Garrett Freight Lines, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 103 Ut. 390, 135 P.2d 523; 
146 A.L.R. 1003. 
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At this juncture, it is interesting to note that the Utah Supreme Court struck down a Salt 
Lake City ordinance in the case of Bryce Roe v. Salt Lake City, 20 Ut.2d 266, 437 P.2d 195 
(1968) because of discriminatory taxation of attorneys. In that case the court voided a city 
ordinance which made each individual attorney a separate business entity subject to a revenue 
tax. The court reasoned that the tax created an unconstitutional discrimination, in that 
specific individuals were treated as business entities, regardless of the business organization 
under which they practiced without any reason for so classifying them. Hence, the court 
reasoned any legal classification was unreasonable and discriminatory in that other members 
of the business community class were taxed uniformly as the organization under which they 
did business. The Court observed: 
4
'No kind of syllogistic reasoning can justify the conclusion that these 
hand-picked businesses (accountants, lawyers, dentists, doctors of medicine, etc.) 
could be members of the general classification, treated equally and uniformly, 
and yet, being such, could not be required to pay a higher tax." Roe v. Salt Lake 
City, id. at page 197. 
It would now be shocking indeed for the tax-paying public of the State to learn that after 
the Utah courts had decided that the City could not tax each lawyer as an individual business 
entity, that neither could it tax the business entities of which he was a partner or member as 
suggested by defendant-appellant. 
Defendant-appellant's argument seems to be that he is being discriminated against as a 
sole practitioner because the members of other firms, on a prorata basis for each lawyer, 
would pay less of a license tax than he as a sole practitioner. Interestingly, plaintiff-appellant 
never discusses the question of the impact of the tax, as it relates to income of the practice. 
However, it is important to note that if this Court were to accept defendant-appellant's 
reasoning, it would place lawyers in a position of being exempt from all taxation, because 
under the Roe case they cannot be taxed as individuals and under defendant-appellant's 
position, the business they operate could not be taxed. Such a two-faced piece of reasoning 
could only alienate the public and confirm many peoples' low opinion of attorneys and their 
belief about lawyers' self-dealing before the courts. 
In addition, a ruling supporting the position of defendant-appellant would be a shocking 
break with a long history of uniform case law which allows legislatures to classify groups for 
8 
taxation based on income. It would permit every small business (no matter how profitable) to 
challenge the fixed fee tax based on income as discriminatory and throw in chaos the whole 
taxing scheme of the Utah cities and others, cf. "Appendix A" and Utah Bar fee schedules 
based on income through the length of tenure in practice; see also, County taxing ordinances 
cited in The State of Utah v. Taylor, infra. The case law is clear that tax classification is a 
legislative function and may be challenged only when its basis is unreasonable. Davis v. 
Ogden City, supra. The burden of proof is on the challenger to prove beyond a "reasonable 
doubt" that the city ordinance is thus in contravention of the constitution to overcome its 
presumption of validity. See Salt Lake City v. Savage, —Ut. —, — P.2d—, Supreme Court 
No. 14000 (1975) and authorities therein cited. Regarding these principles, this Court has 
stated: 
"It is a fundamental rule in construing a statute, when its validity is challenged 
on constitutional grounds, that the courts will not consider mere questions of 
policy or expediency. These are matters of legislation, and belong to the legislative 
department of government. * * * For the judiciary to dictate the matters of policy 
and expediency and seek to nullify acts of the lawmaking body, because it 
conceives that such acts are impolitic or unnecessary, would be just as flagrant a 
violation of the Constitution as would be an act of the Legislature which would 
deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Denver 
& R.G.R. Co. v. Grand County, 51 Ut. 294, 170 P. 75, 76 (1917) (emphasis 
added) 
One must ask: Why is it unreasonable for a legislative body or the Utah Bar 
Association to compute the fee based on income or to define a class of taxpayers on that 
basis. Defendant-appellant offers no answer other than to state that the city tax cost per 
licensed attorney is disproportionate. However, no explanation is or can be given why that is 
unreasonable, as opposed to the obvious fairness of such a method of tax computation for a 
less profitable corporate form of operation. Certainly a sole proprietorship or sole 
practitioner, for example, with a large para-legal staff running a lucrative specialty or 
collection practice, is better able to bear the revenue license tax than a corporate organization, 
earning less than $10,000.00. In fact this Court has specifically affirmed the validity of a 
county ordinance identical to the one before the bar against an attack of unconstitutional 
discrimination. The Court stated: 
"Under a taxing statute, if the exempted persons or businesses may be included 
in a distinct class, then the equal protection of the laws has not been denied to 
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those taxed." State of Utah v. Taylor, Utah Supreme Court Case No. 13949 
(1975) and authorities therein cited. 
It is respectfully submitted that, as a matter of law, the defendant-appellant has failed to 
meet its burden of proof. This Court should adopt the law and reasoning of the San Mateo 
case quoted extensively above and should follow its own recent decision that upholds the 
validity of revenue tax classifications, basing fees on gross income of the enterprise. 
POINT III 
THERE EXIST NO FACTS TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATIONS OF DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT THAT THE ORDINANCE BEFORE THE COURT HAS BEEN 
DISCRIMINATORILY APPLIED OR ADMINISTERED. 
The undisputed and uncontroverted facts show the following: 
" 1 . Every place of business within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City and 
within the knowledge of the City License Department has been licensed and taxed 
pursuant to the rates set forth in the Salt Lake City ordinances. Those business 
entities taxed include lawyers, dentists, physicians, and all other professional 
persons who render services for economic gain as per the definition of "business" 
and "place of business" within the Salt Lake City ordinances. 
"2. Your affiant (Thad Emery) has found by experience that attorneys are 
somewhat transcient and that they frequently change business locations, phone 
numbers and association. For example, lawyers may change from a large firm 
under which they are treated as an employee for city taxing purposes into 
proprietorship practice without informing the License Department; therefore, the 
License Department is at times unaware that a change has taken place and that the 
individual may be now obligated to pay personally a Business Revenue License 
Tax. However, the City License Department expends every effort to tax every old 
and new business entity, including lawyers, by canvassing business office 
buildings, telephone directories and, among other devices, reviewing prior 
licensing records. 
" 3 . During the year 1972, the City License Assessor's Office was staffed by 
Thad Emery, Assessor; Charles Ross, Collector; one stenographer; two clerk 
typists; and two part-time employeers, who conducted canvassing and other 
assigned duties. With the efforts of these personnel, the City issued over 12,600 
City licenses and collected over $600,000.00 in revenue. 
"4. The affiant (Thad Emery) and his staff have expended every effort within 
the capabilities of their office, as circumscribed by manpower and budgetary 
limitations, to find and locate every place of business and every individual, 
company and firm (including lawyers) who should pay Business Revenue License 
Tax and assess the same. Every business, including persons rendering professional 
services, which constitutes "place of business" and is within the corporate limits 
of Salt Lake City has been assessed if they are within the knowledge of the License 
Department. 
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"5 . The name of the defendant, Golden W. Robbins, was discovered in a 
canvass of office buildings in Salt Lake City and was determined not to be paying 
the required City Business Revenue Tax. The records of the City License 
Department show he has paid no City Business Revenue Taxes as per the 
allegation in the City's complaint on file in the within matter." 
Affidavit of Thab B. Emery 
City License Assessor 
(R-150) 
"6. Your client has not knowlingly or intentionally failed to assess or collect a 
revenue license fee from any person whom such a fee was legally due. We extend a 
good faith effort to assess and collect every person, including attorneys and other 
professionals, the license fee due." 
Affidavit of Thad B. Emery 
Dated January, 1974 (R-59) 
Further, contrary to the naked assertion of defendant-appellant, the record shows that 
every lawyer privately practicing law has paid a license fee, excepting only those individuals 
who: (a) are licensed members of the Bar in the category of Richard Aaron who is a 
University of Utah law professor and not in private practice; (b) are in the category of Bailey 
Anderson and not in the private practice, but are full-time employees of corporations who 
pay their own business fee; (c) in the category of Hayden B. Austin who are not listed in the 
yellow pages and for whom no address in Salt Lake City could be determined; and (d) have 
not paid the tax and have been turned over to the City Attorney's Office for collection. Of the 
390 names, the plaintiff-appellant inserted in his affidavit as being individuals who have not 
paid, every one has been fully accounted for and shown to be either paid as a member of a 
firm,vto be practicing within the limits of Salt Lake City, employees of private corporations 
(not practicing law), or individuals whose accounts have been turned over for collection. 
(See R-59 and Exhibits attached thereto) 
It is interesting to note that neither the defendant-appellant who is an experienced and 
able attorney of this Court nor his counsel have asserted that there is an issue of fact in the 
lower court Summary Judgment proceedings. The lower court found no issue of fact 
concerning this issue of alleged discriminatory application of statute and the writer 
respectfully suggests that a careful reading of the Affidavit and matters of record will clearly 
show that there is no genuine material issue of fact. As a matter of law there are no facts upon 
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which defendant-appellant can base a charge of discriminatory application. If this point were 
seriously proffered there would clearly be an issue of fact to be resolved by the finder of fact. 
Importantly, it is also to be noted that there has been no allegation and no proof that the 
City engaged in any bad faith discrimination in the application of this tax. 
Defendant-appellant's own case law indicates that this fact is a condition precedent for a 
defense of discriminatory application of tax statute. This Court clearly so held, stating: 
" . . . However, before this result is reached (avoiding tax liability on the grounds 
of discriminatory application of a taxing statute), it must be shown that there is an 
intentional and systematic violation of those constitutional principles, or some 
designed effort to violate them, to the injury of the complainant.... 
* * * * 
"A mere mistaken or inadvertent failure to properly apply the law, even if it 
results in discrimination, does not provide a basis for recovery by a taxpayer 
because of violation of his constitutional guarantees. It would be a doctrine 
hazardous indeed to the taxing process and to the maintenance of government to 
rule that if the assessor has made mistakes in taxing others, a complaining 
taxpayer could escape taxation. The result would be that the law could not be 
applied to anyone until it has been correctly applied to all. It requires very little 
imagination to see that this would extend, not curtail, noncompliance with the 
law. Even though it may be difficult or impossible to achieve completely, the 
desideratum, of course, is that there be uniformity and equality in taxation, and 
that is the objective to be constantly pursued. However, the fact that this ideal is 
not reached should not be permitted to discourage attempts of taxing officials to 
bring it about, nor to defeat the legislative purpose. Where some taxpayers are not 
being taxed in accordance with the law, the proper way to rectify the situation is 
by proceeding toward uniform and proper application and not by extending the 
erroneous application to others." Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. Peterson, 
(1964) 15 Ut.2d 353, 393 P.2d 391, 196 and authorities therein cited (emphasis 
added) 
It is respectfully submitted that as a matter of law there are no facts to justify the 
allegation that defendant-appellant should be excused from paying the tax because of a 
discriminatory application. On the contrary, the facts are clear and uncontroverted that a 
good faith effort has been made to assess every individual within the taxing classification. 
This Court should uphold the decision of the lower court on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no allegation or fact to show that Salt Lake City has in any way attempted to 
regulate, supervise or exercise jurisdiction over the practice of law. Rather, it has passed a 
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revenue measure equally applied to all persons engaged in activities for economic gain and tax 
them on the basis of income. This Court has clearly upheld the power of cities under the 
provision of 10-8-80, Utah Code Ann., to collect such revenues from professionals as well as 
other income-producing organizations within the corporate limits of the City. These fees 
provide city services and lawyers have no special immunity from paying their fair share of 
these taxes. 
A taxing measure which bases its fee on income of the business is not unreasonable 
classification. The challenger of such a law has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt such a classification is discriminatory and unreasonable, to overcome a strong 
presumption of the constitutionality of legislative acts. There are no facts in the record to 
show that the legislative decision to base license fees on revenue, as opposed to some other 
formula, is unreasonable. The taxing method of computation cannot be ruled as a matter of 
law to be unreasonable, capricious or illegal. 
Finally, before one can avoid taxes by charging that there has been a discriminatory 
application, one must prove intentional and systematic discrimination. Mere mistakes or 
inadvertant failure to apply the law is not grounds to avoid the payment of taxes. There are no 
facts to show such intentional or wilfull acts on the part of city officials. On the contrary, the 
undisputed facts show an actual good faith effort to tax every business, including 
professionals of all descriptions. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that this Court should uphold the judgment 
against the defendant-appellant and affirm the city's ordinance as constitutional per se and 
as applied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
City Attorney 
101 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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APPENDIX A 
Sec. 20-1-1. Unlawful to transact business without a license. It shall be unlawful for any 
person to engage in or carry on any business, trade, profession or calling, within Salt Lake 
City, for the transaction or carrying on of which a license is require, without first taking out 
or procuring a license required for such business, trade, profession or calling. 
Sec. 20-3-1. Definition. For the purpose of this chapter the following terms shall have 
the meanings herein prescribed: 
(1) Business. "Business" means and includes all activities engaged in within the 
corporate limits of Salt Lake City carried on for the business of gain or economic profit, 
except that the acts of employees rendering service to employers shall not be included in the 
term business unless otherwise specifically prescribed. 
(2) Engaging in Business. "Engaging in business" includes but is not limited to, the 
sale of tangible personal property at retail or wholesale, the manufacturing of goods or 
property and the rendering of personal services for others for a consideration by persons 
engaged in any profession, trade, craft, business, occupation or other calling, except the 
rendering of personal services by an employee to his employer under any contract of personal 
employment. 
(3) Place of Business. "Place of business" means each separate location maintained 
or operated by the licensee within Salt Lake City from which business activity is conducted or 
transacted. 
(4) Employee. "Employee" means the operator, owner or manager of said place of 
business and any persons employed by such person in the operation of said place of business 
in any capacity and also any salesman, agent or independent contractor engaged in the 
operation of said place of business in any capacity. 
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(5) Number of Employees.' 'Number of employees" shall mean the average number 
of employees engaged in business at the place of business each regular working day during the 
preceding calendar year. In computing said number, each regular full-time employee shall be 
counted as one employee, and each part-time employee shall be counted as that fraction 
which is formed by using the total number of hours worked by such employee as the 
numerator and the total number of hours regularly worked by a full-time employee as the 
denominator. 
(6) Person. "Person" shall mean any individual, receiver, assignee, trustee in 
bankruptcy, trust, estate, firm, co-partnership, joint venture, club, company, joint stock 
company, business trust, corporation, association, society or other group of individuals 
acting as a unit, whether mutual, cooperative, fraternal, non-profit or otherwise. 
Sec. 20-3-2. License fee levied, (a) There is hereby levied upon the business of every 
person engaged in business in Salt Lake City at a place of business within the city an annual 
license fee of $30.00 per place of business, plus an additional fee of $3.00 for each and every 
employee, exceeding one, engaged in the operation of said business, based upon the number 
of employees defined in Sec. 20-3-1; provided, however, that any such person may receive an 
exemption of $22.50 annually upon submitting an affidavit that his gross sales of goods 
and-or services for the preceding calendar year were less than $10,000 at such place of 
business, and, further provided, that there shall be a maximum fee of $780.00 for each place 
of business. 
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